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IDAHO PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION

VIA OVERNIGHT MAIL

December 2, 2008

Jean D. Jewell, Secretary
Idaho Public Utilities Commission
P.O. Box 83720
472 W. Washington Street
Boise, Idaho 83720-0074

In re: Case No. IPC-E-08-10

Dear Ms. Jewell:

Enclosed please find nine the original and (8) copies of the REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF KEVIN C. HIGGINS on behalf of THE KROGER CO. dba FRED MEYER AND SMITH'S FOOD AND DRUG to be filed in the above referenced matter. I also attach an electronic version.

Copies have been served on all parties on the attached certificate of service. Please place this document of file.

Respectfully yours,



Michael L. Kurtz, Esq.


Kurt J. Boehm, Esq.

BOEHM, KURTZ & LOWRY

MLKkew
Encl.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that true copy of the foregoing was served by electronic mail, unless otherwise noted, this 2ND day of December, 2008 to the following:



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IDAHO PUBLIC
UTILITIES COMMISSION

**BEFORE THE
IDAHO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION**

IN THE MATTER OF THE)
APPLICATION OF IDAHO POWER)
COMPANY FOR AUTHORITY TO)
INCREASE ITS RATES AND CHARGES)
FOR ELECTRIC SERVICE)

Case No. IPC-E-08-10

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF KEVIN C. HIGGINS

On Behalf of The Kroger Co.,

Doing Business as Fred Meyer and Smith's

December 3, 2008

1 have reviewed Mr. Elam's proposed rate design for Schedules 9-P and 9-T and
2 conclude that his proposal is consistent with the time-of-use design proposed by
3 Idaho Power. Therefore, I support Mr. Elam's proposed rate design at Staff's
4 revenue requirement, while also supporting and Idaho Power's proposed rate
5 design at the Company's proposed revenue requirement.

6 (2) Mr. Yankel proposes to revise Idaho Power's Base Case cost-of-
7 service study by allocating a portion of class costs based on a ten-year forecast of
8 class growth. Mr. Yankel's proposal would assign generation and transmission
9 costs to current customers based on projected increases to class load that have not
10 yet materialized. In my opinion, this proposal is unreasonable and I recommend
11 that it be rejected.

12 (3) Mr. Yankel also proposes to change the basis for allocating the
13 revenue credits to classes attributable to Sales for Resale. Mr. Yankel's proposal
14 fails to take proper account of the differing cost burdens borne by different
15 customer classes for recovery of the production plant from which Sales for Resale
16 are made. In my opinion, Mr. Yankel's proposed change is grossly inequitable
17 and should be rejected.

18
19 **Response to Matt Elam**

20 **Q. In your direct testimony, you expressed strong support for Idaho Power's**
21 **proposal to introduce time-of-use rates for Schedule 9 customers taking**
22 **service at primary and transmission voltages. Have you reviewed the**

1 **proposed modifications to Schedule 9 rates proposed by Staff witness Matt**
2 **Elam?**

3 A. Yes, I have.

4 **Q. What is your assessment of Mr. Elam’s proposed modifications?**

5 A. Mr. Elam also expresses support for Idaho Power’s time-of-use proposal
6 for Schedule 9-P and 9-T customers. However, because Staff proposes a lower
7 revenue requirement than Idaho Power, it is necessary for Mr. Elam to modify the
8 Schedule 9-P and 9-T time-of-use charges to be consistent with this lower revenue
9 requirement.

10 I have reviewed Mr. Elam’s proposed rate design for Schedules 9-P and 9-
11 T and conclude that his proposal is consistent with the time-of-use design
12 proposed by Idaho Power. Therefore, I support Mr. Elam’s proposed rate design
13 at Staff’s revenue requirement, while also supporting Idaho Power’s proposed rate
14 design at the Company’s proposed revenue requirement.

15

16 **Response to Anthony J. Yankel**

17 **Q. What has Mr. Yankel’s proposed with respect to revising Idaho Power’s**
18 **Base Case cost-of-service study?**

19 A. Mr. Yankel has proposed that 50 percent of generation and transmission
20 costs in the Company’s Base Case analysis be allocated on the basis of projected
21 class load growth over the next ten years. Mr. Yankel argues that such an
22 approach would better reflect “forward-looking” costs.¹

¹ Direct testimony of Anthony J. Yankel, p. 18, line 1 - p. 24, line 16.

1 **Q. What is your assessment of this proposal?**

2 A. The fundamentals of this proposition are unreasonable. The proposal
3 would assign generation and transmission costs to current customers based on
4 projected increases to class load that have not yet materialized. The first problem
5 here is that the expected load growth is not necessarily attributable to current
6 customers, but to customers who do not yet exist. As customers who do not yet
7 exist cannot be charged for the “growth correction” being proposed by Mr.
8 Yankel, the burden of this projected growth is instead assigned to the existing
9 customers in the growing classes. Under this approach, class cost responsibility is
10 weighted by (higher) future kilowatt-hours, but costs can only be recovered from
11 current kilowatt-hours, creating an unreasonable cost burden for the affected
12 customer classes.

13 A further problem is that current class cost responsibility would be
14 allocated based on a ten-year growth projection that may not develop as
15 forecasted. This would introduce an undue degree of speculation into the
16 assignment of class cost responsibility.

17 **Q. What is your recommendation with respect to Mr. Yankel’s proposal to**
18 **revise Idaho Power’s Base Case cost-of-service study?**

19 A. I recommend that the proposed revision be rejected.

20 **Q. What change has Mr. Yankel proposed for the allocation of the revenue**
21 **credits to classes attributable to Sales for Resale?**

22 A. Mr. Yankel objects to the traditional allocation of Sales for Resale
23 revenues based on class energy or demand. Instead, Mr. Yankel proposes that

1 each customer class be assigned a percentage share of production plant based on
2 the class's allocation of production plant costs. Each class then would be credited
3 with Sales for Resale revenues to the extent that its load is less than its assigned
4 share of production plant in a given hour. The credit would be for a share of the
5 off-system sales taking place in that hour as well as for deemed "sales" to other
6 customer classes that are consuming more power than their respective "shares" of
7 production plant. Conversely, to the extent that a class's load exceeds its assigned
8 plant share in a given hour, the class would be assessed "purchased power" costs
9 in that hour. As I noted, this crediting of Sales for Resale revenue and assignment
10 of purchased power costs would not be limited to the actual sales and purchase
11 transactions with third parties, but would extend to hourly "sales" and
12 "purchases" that are deemed to take place between "surplus" and "deficit" retail
13 customer classes.

14 The upshot of Mr. Yankel's proposal is that he is intending to allocate a
15 greater portion of Sales for Resale revenue (than would occur under a traditional
16 energy or demand allocator) to those classes that have highly variable usage
17 patterns throughout the year. Mr. Yankel justifies this change based on his claim
18 that classes with highly variable usage patterns "cause" off-system sales to
19 happen because their variable usage patterns result in periods of under-utilization
20 of plant for retail needs, thus "freeing up" the production plant to make off-system
21 sales.

22 **Q. What is your assessment of Mr. Yankel's proposal for allocating Sales for**
23 **Resale revenues?**

1 A. Mr. Yankel's proposal is grossly inequitable and should be rejected. Mr.
 2 Yankel's proposal fails to take proper account of the differing cost burdens borne
 3 by different customer classes for recovery of the production plant from which
 4 Sales for Resale are made. This inequity can be illustrated using the same
 5 example Mr. Yankel developed to make his point.

6 **Q. Please proceed.**

7 A. On pages 38-39 of his direct testimony, Mr. Yankel assumes that a utility
 8 serves a customer Class A that consumes a constant 500 MWh every hour of the
 9 year and a second customer Class B that consumes a constant 500 MWh every
 10 hour for six months and zero for the remaining six months. The utility responds to
 11 this usage pattern by installing 1000 MW of capacity, which exactly meets retail
 12 customer requirements for six months of the year; the utility then sells 500 MW
 13 off system for the six months in which Class B's consumption falls to zero.

14 Mr. Yankel correctly notes that under the 12 CP method for allocating
 15 production plant costs, Class A would be allocated 2/3 of generation demand
 16 costs and Class B would be allocated the remaining 1/3. I expand upon Mr.
 17 Yankel's observation by presenting this cost allocation on a month-by-month
 18 basis below:

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	Total
Class A CP	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	6000
Class B CP	500	500	500	500	500	500	0	0	0	0	0	0	3000
System CP	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	1000	500	500	500	500	500	500	9000

23

1 I point out in passing that, in this example, the 2/3 allocation of generation
2 demand costs to Class A and the 1/3 allocation of generation demand costs to
3 Class B is the same allocation that would obtain if costs were allocated on an
4 energy basis; thus, the set up of this simple example bears some nexus with the
5 historical cost allocation practices in Idaho Power's service area for generation
6 demand cost, which has traditionally been based on a combination of energy and
7 12 CP allocation factors.

8 Mr. Yankel goes on to correctly note that under a conventional treatment
9 for allocating Sales for Resale revenues (such as occurs in Idaho Power's
10 territory), Class A would be allocated 2/3 of the revenue and Class B would be
11 allocated 1/3 of the revenue, based on the principle that the benefit of the revenue
12 credit should track the allocation of plant costs. Mr. Yankel maintains that this
13 result is inappropriate. He argues that the ability for the utility to make off-
14 system sales derives from the highly variable usage pattern of Class B. Because
15 Class B's load disappears for six months out of the year, thus making 500 MW
16 available for off-system sales, Mr. Yankel argues that Class B should receive a
17 greater proportion of the Sales for Resale revenues – 2/3 to be exact. Thus, Class
18 B would pay for 1/3 of the plant costs, but receive 2/3 of the Sales for Resale
19 benefit.

20 To appreciate the inequity of Mr. Yankel's proposal, it is instructive to
21 consider what happens in a month in which an off-system sale is made in his
22 example. Let's consider Month 7 in the table on the preceding page. In Month 7,
23 the utility sells 500 MWh each hour from its production plant of 1000 MW. Mr.

1 Yankel argues that Class B is entitled to 2/3 of the benefit of this sale, since its
2 demand of zero is 333 MW less than its (annual) allocated share of plant costs of
3 333 MW.

4 But how have cost responsibilities been allocated for this month? Because
5 its demand is zero in Month 7, Class B has already been absolved of any cost
6 responsibility in Month 7 under the 12 CP method (or under an energy allocation
7 method, for that matter). Instead, the full burden of paying for the cost of
8 production plant in Month 7 has fallen to Class A – which means that absent Sales
9 for Resale revenues, Class A would not only have to pay for the production plant
10 that serves its 500 MW of load, it would also have to pay for the 500 MW that
11 was built to serve Class B for six months of the year, as Class B has not been
12 assigned any costs in Month 7. Of course, in light of this cost burden, it is
13 entirely appropriate for Class A to receive the lion's share of the benefit for Sales
14 for Resale in Month 7, as would occur under a conventional allocation. Indeed, a
15 reasonable case can be made that Class A is entitled to 100 percent of the Sales
16 for Resale revenues in Month 7, as Class A has been allocated 100 percent of the
17 production plant costs in that month. If anything, a conventional allocation
18 approach is revealed as being unduly generous to Class B by sharing 1/3 of the
19 Sales for Resale revenues in a month in which Class B was absolved of any
20 production plant cost responsibility.

21 **Q. But how can you claim that Class B is absolved of any production plant cost**
22 **responsibility in Month 7 when Class B is allocated 1/3 of production plant**
23 **costs?**

1 A. Look at the table. Class B is allocated 1/3 of production plant costs on an
2 annual basis. It is allocated 50 percent of plant costs for Months 1-6 and zero
3 plant costs in Months 7-12. This averages out to be 1/3 of production plant costs
4 during the course of the year. But in the months in which off-system sales are
5 made, Class B is asked to contribute nothing. This is the key consideration that
6 Mr. Yankel overlooks when he proposes to transfer to this class the majority of
7 the off-system sales benefit.

8 This point can be further illustrated through an analogy. Consider two
9 roommates who share a house and split the rent evenly for six months out of the
10 year. Roommate A resides in the house year-round, whereas Roommate B leaves
11 for six months. When Roommate B is gone, Roommate A has full responsibility
12 for the rent. To mitigate this impact, he sublets the vacant room for six months
13 and (generously) offers Roommate B 1/3 of the proceeds. Roommate B declines
14 the offer and cites Mr. Yankel's argument: Roommate B claims that 2/3 of the
15 proceeds should go to him because if he hadn't moved out for six months, the
16 sublet would not have been possible.

17 I think most parties would agree that Roommate B's claim is
18 unreasonable. It is fundamentally the same claim being made by Mr. Yankel in
19 his example.

20

21 **Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?**

22 A. Yes, it does.